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Evolution of Conjunction Assessment
• Before 1986 Challenger accident, no Shuttle mitigation actions were taken 
for conjunctions based on assumption that predictions were too imprecise
• After Challenger, analysis led to a “box” method for Shuttle protection
Initial Operations:  Space Shuttle
• The 24/7/365 nature of ISS operations meant the box method 
from Shuttle could not be an option
• Work began at NASA/JSC in early 1990’s to develop infrastructure for “Pc” method
• NASA provided support to USSPACECOM to develop covariances, computing 
capability, and “JSpOC” staffing for conjunction detection
• NASA started trial conjunction assessment operations with Russia 
in 1996 on Mir (“Phase I” program, upon arrival of Americans 
onboard)
• Box method always used as trigger to notify Moscow during Mir, and no Russian 
avoidance maneuver was expected or performed
Preparation for ISS operations:  the Probability Method
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Evolution of Conjunction Assessment:  
ISS Operations
Maneuver thresholds determined for ISS
• Balance safety with minimum of operations disruption
• Red threshold of 1-in-10,000:  Always maneuver if possible; 
place crew in Soyuz if maneuver not possible 
• Yellow threshold of 1-in-100,000:  Maneuver if convenient
Invented Orbital Conjunction Message (OCM) 
format with USSTRATCOM
Developed “validity criteria” on OCMs to ensure 
maneuver decisions based on good data
• Requires multiple updates, with prediction variations within 
expected bounds
Shuttle program and Goddard later adopted 
probability method for conjunctions




































annual debris flux = 0.3 obj/km2/year
2260 meter2 cross section vehicle
Pm for 60 meter radius sphere
for 8 hour propagation
Example of risk evaluations used to 
determine ISS maneuver thresholds
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Developing ISS Operations
International coordination 
required to establish ISS 
DAM capability
• ISS has had 6 different vehicles to act 
as propulsion module, each requiring 
varying kinds of coordination:
• FGB (Zarya) until SM arrival
• Service Module (Zvezda)
• Progress:  aft and nadir
• ESA’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV)
• Soyuz (contingency; never used)
• Shuttle
• Each method (except Shuttle) relies 
on a planning template requiring >28 
hours
5JSC/MOD/Flight Dynamics    Lark Howorth (281) 483-2754                william.l.howorth@nasa.gov  
12 ISS debris avoidance maneuvers attempted 
7 performed by ISS
1 attempted by ISS, but failed (ISS’s first attempt)
4 performed by Shuttle during mated operations
ISS Debris Avoidance Maneuver History
Date Debris Object Vehicle Notes
06/03/99 1844 (SL-3 R/B) FGB Maneuver Execution FAILED.  Two PC violations (1E-2 and 1E-3) early in event based on bad data
10/26/99 25422 (Pegasus R/B) FGB
First successful ISS DAM and only DAM performed by FGB.
Highest PC = 1E-03. 
09/29/00 5143 (SL-3 R/B) Progress 1P Maneuver on Yellow threshold violation
02/10/01 87610 (Unknown Debris) STS-98 (5A) Shuttle Box method used
12/15/01 5730 (SL-8 R/B) STS-108 (UF-1) Shuttle PC method used
05/15/02 23279 (SL-8 R/B) Progress 7P Pc = 1E-03 (red threshold violation)
05/30/03 25722 (MEGSAT) Progress 10P Pc = 9E-04 (red threshold violation)
08/27/08 33246 (COSMOS 2421 Debris) ATV-1 Pc =2E-02 (red threshold violation) and largest PC calculated to date
03/22/09 26264 (CZ-4 Debris) STS-119 (15A)
Red threshold violations on a multi-repeating conjunction.  TCAs were during an EVA, so a 
Retrograde DAM was executed early by having orbiter hold attitude.
07/18/09 84180 (Unknown Debris) STS-127 (2 JA)
TCA occurred 15 hours after STS-127 docking (during crew sleep).  Due to the docking 
perturbations, a red threshold violation was computed and a reboost was performed by the 
Shuttle before the crew went to sleep.
10/26/10 37195 (UARS Debris) Progress 39P
Pc = 5E-03 (red threshold violation). Probabilities were yellow & red threshold violations 
throughout the event.
4/2/11 34443 (Cosmos 2251 Debris) ATV-2 Conjunction with dozens of repeating passes, high drag.  Prime TCA shifted later during event
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Visiting Vehicle Protection
The Trajectory Operations group (TOPO) at MCC-Houston integrates the 
trajectories of ISS and all vehicles coming to ISS
In recent years, the TOPO office began implementing debris avoidance support 
for the operators of these visiting vehicles
• ESA’s ATV (1 mission per year)
• JAXA’s HTV (1 mission per year)
• Russia’s Soyuz and Progress (approximately 7 missions per year)
• Commercial vehicles (SpaceX Dragon and Orbital Cygnus) (1-2 missions per year each)
• This protects not only the vehicles in rendezvous, but keeps the ISS environment safe as well.
TOPOs use close relationship with JSpOC to help provide the highest-quality data 
for use in protecting these vehicles
• Maintain single human spaceflight point of contact with JSpOC to provide data for partners to assess risk
• As with ISS, all visiting vehicles screen their planned maneuvers against debris catalog
• In development of conjunction operations, TOPO has provided expertise in
• Negotiating ephemeris formats and notification thresholds with JSpOC on behalf of partners
• Providing primary or backup collision probability calculations during mission
• Currently, operational responses are still the responsibility of the operating partner and vary for each vehicle
• With high levels of vehicle traffic expected for many years, ops standardization might become more important
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Implemented Conjunction Improvements for ISS
Russian pre-maneuver command verification improved
Developed “validity criteria” to ensure good Pc 
calculations so unnecessary actions aren’t taken
Improvements in notification criteria to reduce false 
alarms
Implementation of capability to cancel a DAM almost up 
to the time of ignition
Crew Soyuz “shelter in place” capability for late 
notifications where DAM not possible
Ongoing improvements in orbit determination capabilities 
at USSTRATCOM/JSpOC
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ISS Lessons Learned
•“1844 Incident” (1999) proved the need for a very well-defined 
process, well-trained people, and software adequate to the task
– A sequence of errors occurred among all parties, from conjunction 
identification, to “debris clearing” of the DAM, to failed execution of the 
maneuver.  Actions taken:
• Ground processes between Houston and Moscow made clearer
• Russian maneuver command testing implemented
• NASA and USSTRATCOM began routine familiarization cross-training
•Constant improvements to balance safety and mission viability are 
beneficial
– Excessive conjunction notifications from Houston to Moscow early in 
ISS program caused personnel overwork
– In response, partners implemented smarter conjunction notification 
criteria
•Flexibility in planning avoidance maneuvers is key in reducing the 
likelihood of needing to execute them
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ISS vs. Cosmos 2251 Debris
• April 2011 conjunctions with 
Cosmos 2251 had over 40 
registered close passes
• Highest concern TCA changed 
over time
• 0.5 m/s DAM was executed to 
protect highest Pc cases
• Scenario shows value of flexible 
maneuvering capability
• There may be better ways to 
assess risk for repeaters in the 
future
TCA (GMT) TCA-30 (CDT) U V W R 
Time to 
TCA Pc 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 03:41:59.541 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 04:42 PM CDT 2.6 29.5 -7.7 30.6 44.7 3.54E-13 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 04:27:40.973 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 05:27 PM CDT -2.1 133.1 34.2 137.4 25.9 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 05:13:39.612 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 06:13 PM CDT 2.5 -64.4 16.6 66.5 15.7 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 05:59:18.063 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 06:59 PM CDT -1.5 106.0 27.1 109.4 27.4 1.90E-10 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 06:45:16.485 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 07:45 PM CDT 1.7 -87.4 22.4 90.2 17.2 1.23E-19 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 07:30:52.375 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 08:30 PM CDT -2.7 121.0 30.8 124.9 22 9.61E-06 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 08:16:51.811 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 09:16 PM CDT 1.1 -90.9 23.3 93.9 24.2 5.77E-15 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 09:02:30.236 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 10:02 PM CDT -2.1 85.9 21.8 88.6 19.5 2.16E-06 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 09:48:28.154 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 10:48 PM CDT 0.4 -107.5 27.4 110.9 25.7 9.66E-08 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 10:34:06.606 2011 089 (Wed, 30 Mar) 11:34 PM CDT -1.9 68.5 17.3 70.7 21 1.85E-12 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 11:20:05.111 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 12:20 AM CDT -0.5 -135.5 34.4 139.8 30 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 12:05:42.765 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 01:05 AM CDT -1.6 53.1 13.4 54.8 22.6 4.96E-17 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 12:51:41.170 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 01:51 AM CDT -1.3 -149.8 37.9 154.5 31.5 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 13:37:18.883 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 02:37 AM CDT -1.4 39.3 9.9 40.5 24.1 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 15:08:54.994 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 04:08 AM CDT -1.3 27.0 6.8 27.9 25.6 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 16:40:30.795 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 05:40 AM CDT -1.3 17.3 4.3 17.9 27.2 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 18:12:06.496 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 07:12 AM CDT -1.3 8.4 2.1 8.7 28.7 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 19:43:42.272 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 08:43 AM CDT -1.3 2.0 0.5 2.5 30.2 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 21:15:17.857 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 10:15 AM CDT -1.2 -1.8 -0.4 2.2 31.7 0.00E+00 
2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 22:46:53.255 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 11:46 AM CDT -1.1 -3.7 -0.9 4.0 33.3 0.00E+00 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 00:18:28.483 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 01:18 PM CDT -1.0 -3.3 -0.8 3.5 34.8 0.00E+00 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 01:50:03.495 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 02:50 PM CDT -0.8 -1.1 -0.3 1.4 36.3 8.96E-20 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 03:21:38.420 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 04:21 PM CDT -0.5 2.5 0.6 2.6 37.8 4.28E-09 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 04:53:13.332 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 05:53 PM CDT -0.2 7.5 1.8 7.7 39.4 8.58E-05 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 06:24:48.222 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 07:24 PM CDT -0.2 15.2 3.7 15.7 40.9 1.31E-04 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 07:56:22.833 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 08:56 PM CDT -0.3 25.9 6.3 26.7 42.4 7.54E-05 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 09:27:57.249 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 10:27 PM CDT -0.3 38.5 9.3 39.6 43.9 1.44E-04 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 10:59:31.460 2011 090 (Thu, 31 Mar) 11:59 PM CDT -0.2 53.6 12.9 55.1 45.5 2.25E-06 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 11:45:25.418 2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 12:45 AM CDT -8.6 -19.7 4.8 22.0 76.7 3.54E-13 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 12:31:05.538 2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 01:31 AM CDT -0.1 70.4 16.9 72.4 47 7.01E-14 
2011 092 (Sat, 02 Apr) 14:02:39.616 2011 091 (Fri, 01 Apr) 03:02 AM CDT -0.2 88.9 21.2 91.4 48.5 0.00E+00 
 
Summary of ISS conjunctions with object 34443
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 Frequency of notifications varies substantially depending on debris population at vehicle 
altitude.  Number of ISS conjunctions:
 390 from ISS first element launch through July 2008 (~0.8 conjunctions per week)
200 from August 2008 through April 2009 (~5 per week)
COSMOS 2421 – Three breakup events in 2008:  14-March, 28-April, 9-June
 COSMOS 2251 / Iridium 33 collision 10-February-2009
191 from May 2009 through present (~2 conjunctions/week)
As ISS raises permanent altitude from 350 km to 410 km this year, conjunction frequency 
may increase
Lesson: Conjunction Frequency vs. Debris Flux 
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Conjunction Operations Considerations for ISS
•Maximum consequences if we fail
•Size of vehicle: 140 meters between farthest points of solar arrays
•Low altitude, high-drag environment means making assessments for 
“correct” operations difficult
– Late-notifications (“false negatives”)
– Unnecessary concern for some objects
– Highly erratic predictions for small debris
– High Pc for objects very far away (>100 km)
•Many requirements on ISS orbit to satisfy visiting vehicle success
– Space Shuttle rendezvous on flight day 3
– Space Shuttle maximum rendezvous altitude
– Soyuz/Progress rendezvous on FD3; daylight landing in Russian zone
– HTV perigee limits
– ATV mission design limits
– Future vehicle requirements?
– All of these must be considered when designing a DAM for safety
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Improvements for the Future
•Improving covariance realism
•Implementing late-notification DAM capabilities 
– Allows critical decisions to be made when uncertainties are small
•Solving the repeating conjunction problem
•Developing covariances for perturbing events on ISS
– Docking/undocking
– Reboost
– Propulsive attitude maneuver
•Adapting operations/resources to an increasing debris population
– Future collisions, satellite breakups
– Improved tracking capability may find more, and smaller, objects
•Overhaul criteria to determine if a Pc is valid
•Investigate using covariance-based debris screening (instead of 
fixed volumes)
